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NO. 42 NOVEMBER 2019 Introduction 
Polar Power USA: 
Full Steam Ahead into the Arctic 
Michael Paul 
The Arctic’s melting ice not only acts as an early warning system for the world’s 
climate, but also makes this region an indicator of change for international security 
policy. The Trump administration sees the Arctic primarily as an arena of competi-
tion between great powers. This could both benefit and harm the region. A greater 
engagement on the part of the USA would be welcome, but if it comes with an at-
tempt to exclude other states, this would damage the high level of cooperation that 
has held sway in the Arctic thus far. US Arctic policy has become a variable that is 
dependent on great-power rivalry. The resulting polarisation of relations makes it 
difficult to find the necessary common solutions for coping with the changes caused 
by global warming. 
 
China and Russia are the main driving 
forces in the great-power competition for 
the development of Arctic passages and 
resources. Having ignored the Arctic for 
years, the US has recently sought to curb 
the influence and investment of countries 
that are far from the Arctic such as China 
(which was admitted to the Arctic Council 
as an observer in 2013, and which sees 
itself as a “Near-Arctic State”). It is not only 
in Denmark and Greenland that such be-
haviour meets with resistance. Other states 
with observer status are also likely to be 
irritated by such attempts of exclusion. 
Blaming Moscow and Beijing for militari-
sation of the Arctic also rebounds on the 
Trump administration, which is in turn 
accused of jeopardising traditionally peace-
ful cooperation in the Arctic. The era of 
“Arctic exceptionalism” is obviously coming 
to an end. 
The more military security is in the Arctic 
becomes a topic, the more NATO will be-
come involved. The Arctic states Denmark, 
Iceland, Canada and Norway are members 
of the Alliance; Sweden and Finland are 
closely connected to it via exercises and 
almost full interoperability. Although mili-
tary security in the High North is not a 
matter for the Arctic Council, it is of grow-
ing importance for NATO. While Norway 
regards the region as an insecure northern 
flank, Canada, with its policy of “High 
North, Low Tension”, is the least enthusias-
tic about a heightened NATO engagement. 
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The Reluctant Arctic Power 
With its 1.718 million sq km, Alaska is the 
largest exclave in the world by surface area. 
By acquiring it in 1867, the USA became an 
Arctic state. Alaska borders Canada to the 
east, the Bering Sea to the west, the Arctic 
Ocean to the north and the Gulf of Alaska 
to the south. The USA and Russia are only 
85 kilometres apart at the narrowest point 
of the Bering Strait. After the end of the 
Cold War, the Arctic initially played no 
political role in Washington. However, the 
intensifying great-power rivalry in addition 
to the melting sea ice is changing percep-
tions, and the Arctic is becoming a “relative 
priority” in the Trump administration. 
Vague aspirations, relative neglect 
compared to other regions, and reluctant 
engagement long characterised US Arctic 
policy from the early 1990s onwards. In 
a directive of June 1994, President Bill 
Clinton placed great emphasis on “unprec-
edented opportunities for collaboration 
among all eight Arctic nations” on the basis 
of new cooperation with Russia. After that, 
no US Arctic policy was articulated for more 
than ten years. George W. Bush’s govern-
ment allowed oil exploration in the Chuk-
chi Sea in February 2008, only to discover 
that the results of test drilling were dis-
appointing. Two presidential directives in 
January 2009, at the end of Bush’s term, 
suggested minimal engagement just like 
Clinton; the USA remained at a distance. 
Barack Obama did not define the goals 
of his Arctic policy until May 2013, during 
his second term. His strategy paper set the 
expansion of Arctic infrastructure and the 
strengthening of international cooperation 
as goals, and saw the responsible use of oil 
and gas resources as an important contribu-
tion to national energy supply. The Arctic 
should remain a “conflict-free area”, with 
the Arctic Council playing an important 
role as a forum to promote cooperation 
“within its current mandate” (of which 
military security issues are not a part). 
When the USA took over the Presidency of 
the Council (2015–17), a US Special Repre-
sentative for the Arctic was appointed for 
the first time. Overall, the record was 
modest; Obama’s Arctic strategy comple-
mented much earlier directives, and ulti-
mately the attempt to persuade Congress to 
approve new icebreakers remained unsuc-
cessful. The Pentagon stated in December 
2016 that the Arctic remained an area of 
cooperation, although there were still “fric-
tion points” with Canada and Russia con-
cerning sea routes. 
One of the main differences between 
Donald Trump and his predecessor is that 
he has turned his back on the Paris Agree-
ment on climate change and withdrawn 
numerous environmental protection meas-
ures. Since he denies climate change, he 
has ordered resources in the Arctic to be 
further exploited and less protected. He 
has also described Obama’s Clean Power 
Plan as harmful and unnecessary. Instead 
of reducing emissions, planned coal pro-
duction will probably increase them. In 
March 2019, Trump issued a decree to 
release approximately 52 million hectares 
of a previously protected area for drilling. 
In August 2019 – while fires raged in 
Alaska, Greenland and Siberia – Trump 
instructed his Secretary for Agriculture 
to exempt more than half of the world’s 
largest intact temperate rainforest, the 
Tongass National Forest, from the logging 
ban. More than 50 attempts to roll back 
environmental rules and regulations were 
successful, others are still in progress. 
For the first time in the history of the 
Arctic Council, the meeting in May 2019 
nearly ended without a final statement 
because the US delegation led by Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo rejected the concept 
of climate change. Instead, a blank text was 
published. While several speakers at the 
Arctic Circle meeting in Reykjavik in Octo-
ber 2019 stressed the need to reduce emis-
sions and thus mitigate the worst effects 
of climate change, US Secretary of Energy 
Rick Perry praised the “incredible... energy 
potential” of the Arctic. Trump’s energy 
policy is ploughing full steam ahead into 
the Arctic. 
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International Security 
in the Arctic 
As for international security, under Trump 
the great-power rivalry also shapes how his 
administration deals with the Arctic. The 
latter was mentioned only once in passing 
in the National Security Strategy 2017 and 
not at all in the open version of the Defence 
Strategy 2018. But the Pentagon’s Arctic 
Strategy published in June 2019 blatantly 
deviates from the former cooperative 
approach and focuses on “China and Russia 
as the principal challenge to long-term US 
security and prosperity” from the outset. 
The Arctic is, in the language of the Cold 
War, “a potential vector for attacks [...] on 
the homeland”. This is nothing new with 
regard to the nuclear-armed submarines of 
the Russian Northern Fleet, but could in the 
future also mean Chinese submarines in 
Arctic waters (or even in Russian Arctic 
ports). In order to implement the strategy, 
extensive measures must be taken to main-
tain and expand the Arctic bases, in particu-
lar of the US Air Force. So far, however, it is 
unclear whether the Pentagon is prepared 
to make the necessary investment. 
The Pentagon regards the network of 
American allies and partners as the USA’s 
greatest strategic advantage in the region 
and the cornerstone of its strategy. But how 
should Trump’s idea to buy the island of 
Greenland from Denmark – an important 
US ally in the Arctic and NATO – be inter-
preted? Danish Prime Minister Mette Frede-
riksen rejected it as “absurd”. In accordance 
with the island’s autonomous status and 
right of self-determination, its population 
(and not the government in Copenhagen) 
has to decide whether Greenland would 
like to become part of the USA. In fact, 
Trump’s offer was a reaction to China’s 
interest in Greenland as part of the Polar 
Silk Road. The island’s rare earth depos-
its – whose production is already 90 per-
cent dominated by China – also make it 
attractive. According to a paper compiled 
by Chinese Arctic researchers, a “small and 
weak Greenland nation” could in future be 
the “most important link for the successful 
implementation of the Polar Silk Road”. 
Pompeo compared this stance to China’s 
approach in the Indo-Pacific. The US’s cur-
rent Arctic policy is thus strongly shaped 
by great-power rivalries. According to that 
geostrategic perspective, Greenland lies at 
the very tip of North America. 
In July 2018 the US Navy, with Russia in 
mind, reactivated the Second Fleet that was 
originally set up to deter the Soviet Navy in 
the North Atlantic during the Cold War. Its 
new zone of deployment now also includes 
the Arctic. An operation centre was tem-
porarily set up in Keflavík, Iceland. In its 
April 2019 strategy paper, the US Coast 
Guard also mentions various challenges 
posed by Russia and China; the US Navy 
considers the associated conflict risk to be 
low. As in the Pacific, however, Freedom 
of Navigation operations (FONOP) in Arctic 
waters are under discussion. This concerns 
the sea routes claimed by Canada and Rus-
sia, both of whom consider them domestic 
rather than international waterways. 
Washington is particularly critical of Mos-
cow’s restrictive policy on the Northern Sea 
Route. The potential for competing fishing 
fleets has also been mentioned as a reason 
for FONOPs. A deep-sea port in the Bering 
Sea (Nome) has been discussed for years, 
which could accommodate coastguard and 
naval vessels. The aim is to re-establish a 
permanent presence in the Arctic, particu-
larly since shipping traffic has increased 
considerably. Currently, only a few US 
Coast Guard aircraft are deployed in the 
Bering Strait and the Arctic. Furthermore, 
the military base on the Aleutian island 
of Adak could once again accommodate 
ships and aircraft (P-8A). Since the US Coast 
Guard currently has only one heavy ice-
breaker, it plans to procure new ships for 
polar operations; the first Polar Security 
Cutter is scheduled to begin construction 
in 2021 and be delivered in 2024. 
(Re-)Militarisation of the Arctic? 
Given its geographical location, the United 
States has a natural advantage over coun-
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tries such as China or Russia. The Atlantic, 
Pacific and Arctic Oceans offer security that 
only a peer and rival on the opposite coast 
could threaten. For a long time, Arctic secu-
rity issues therefore did not play an impor-
tant part in US defence policy; a report did 
not mention military security as one of the 
strategic objectives in the Arctic for 2030. 
This is beginning to change. 
In 2018 – and for the first time since 
1991 – the US Sixth Fleet was back in 
Arctic waters as part of the NATO exercise 
Trident Juncture. And the Arctic also re-
mains important for air and missile defence 
in the context of strategic deterrence and 
defence. The shortest route for missiles from 
Russia and China to the USA cuts across 
the Arctic. The US Navy regularly trains the 
war-fighting capabilities of submarines in 
extreme cold-water conditions as part of 
ICEX (Ice Exercise). In March 2018 it did so 
again together with the British Navy for the 
first time in a decade. Aside from that, the 
US Navy has only a “minimal presence” in 
the region. US Admiral (ret.) James Stavridis 
has stated that the USA does not yet need 
a fleet for the Arctic, but should reserve 
the number for a Ninth Fleet for the High 
North. Probably, the US Navy, which is 
already under stress in areas of operation 
scattered across the globe, would then need 
even more ships than the planned number 
of 355 – and with different ice classes. 
Diplomats from Nordic countries, who 
have long criticised the US’s lack of interest 
in the High North, are now concerned about 
the US’s aggressive behaviour, as exempli-
fied by its Secretary of State. Sweden’s 
former foreign minister Margot Wallström 
has criticised the “sad and dangerous” 
approach of American Arctic policy, which, 
she said, endangered decades of coopera-
tion with countries like Russia and China. 
Moreover, she pointed out, security policy 
had never been a matter for the Arctic 
Council, and should not become one. The 
USA made an about-turn in this respect 
when Pompeo declared that the Arctic Coun-
cil had so far allowed itself the “luxury” of 
dealing only with issues of scientific co-
operation, culture and the environment. 
Now, he stated, the Arctic was rapidly 
gaining new strategic importance, and 
since China and Russia were militarising 
the Arctic, America’s security and presence 
in the region needed to be strengthened. 
Conclusion and Prospects 
Thus far there have been very few occasions 
for conflict with China or Russia. Although 
recognition of the continental shelf is 
still pending, Russian claims do not affect 
any American territories. Nevertheless, 
approaches that aim to continue the long-
standing cooperation may fail due to the 
polarisation of relations. As late as 2018, 
the USA and Russia agreed to regulate 
shipping traffic in the Bering Strait and 
Bering Sea, where there are now more 
than 400 passages a year. 
The Trump administration denies cli-
mate change, yet its very consequences – 
sea routes that are open for longer in sum-
mer, and exploitation of more accessible 
resources – have awakened their interest 
in the Arctic. Rather than excluding other 
states, however, a policy of integration 
would make sense to promote a sustainable 
and peaceful development of the Arctic. 
Russia will take over the chairmanship 
of the Arctic Council from Iceland in 2021. 
Security issues should be discussed well in 
advance in an appropriate framework such 
as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and a 
code of conduct should be developed to in-
crease transparency and prevent miscalcu-
lations. 
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